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THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION NOW: RECOVERY OR 
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liam Heinemann Ltd. 1992. Pp. viii, 289. 
Edward B. Foley 2 
Anyone who follows developments in American constitutional 
theory should be interested in this new book on the British constitu-
tion by Ferdinand Mount, a journalist of considerable stature in 
Britain. Bruce Ackerman has recently written that this century's 
preeminent American constitutional scholars have failed to appreci-
ate the virtuous complexities of the U.S. Constitution-especially 
the institution of judicial review-because of their misplaced affec-
tion for the British constitution and its apparent simplicity. 3 
Mount's book now argues that British constitutional law is much 
more complicated than everyone, including the American Anglo-
philes, has thought it to be. 
I 
Although Ackerman may overstate his case against the Anglo-
philes, there is at least some truth to his charge. Such prominent 
American scholars as Bickel and Ely do appear to imagine pure 
democracy as being an omnipotent Parliament of the kind that Brit-
ain is thought to have.4 And with this conception of democracy in 
I. Editor, Times Literary Supplement. Mount's previous positions include Director of 
the Centre for Policy Studies, a British think tank, and political correspondent for The Spec· 
tator. Perhaps because of Mount's talents and training as a writer and editor, his book is a 
joy to read for the elegance of its style as well as the substance of its ideas. 
2. Assistant Professor of Law, The Ohio State University. Thanks to all who gave me 
comments on an earlier version of this essay. 
3. See Bruce Ackerman, We The People: Foundations 7-8 (Belknap Press, 1991) ("We 
The People"). Ackerman sees this Anglophile tendency in American constitutional scholar-
ship passing from Woodrow Wilson and James Thayer to Felix Frankfurter and Alexander 
Bickel, and then to John Hart Ely and other contemporary theorists. See id. at II; see also 
id. at 84, 222 (discussing Wilson's preference for the British parliamentary system). 
4. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (Bobbs-Merrill, 1962); John 
Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust (Harv. U. Press, 1980). 
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mind, judicial review of the Legislature's enactments certainly does 
look like a "deviant institution,"s which must be restrained to a 
narrow role (and only then if special circumstances warrant). 
Ackerman seeks to rehabilitate judicial review as an entirely 
legitimate institution in America's constitutional democracy, and he 
proposes to do this by replacing parliamentary omnipotence as the 
guiding image of democracy with a different and more complicated 
conception of democracy, which he calls "neo-Federalism" because 
he attributes its origins to the Federalist Papers.6 By invoking the 
Federalist Papers in this way, Ackerman hopes to return American 
constitutional scholarship to its roots, thereby repairing the damage 
done by a century of misguided Anglophiles. 1 
Given the nature of Ackerman's mission, and the prominence 
of his project,s it is certainly noteworthy that Mount's new book on 
the British constitution relies heavily on the Federalist Papers to 
attack the idea of parliamentary omnipotence. Mount recognizes, 
of course, that for over a century the prevailing view of British con-
stitutional scholars has been that the British constitution establishes 
5. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch at 18 (cited in note 4). 
6. As readers of this journal already know, see Terrance Sandalow, Abstract Democ-
racy, 9 Canst. Comm. 309 (1992), Ackerman's neo-Federalist conception of democracy is 
"dualist" because it distinguishes between two different types of lawmaking: (l) ordinary 
legislation enacted by the legislature; and (2) extraordinary legislation adopted by the People 
themselves. According to this dualist feature of neo-Federalism, the enactments of the legis-
lature are not supreme; rather, they are subordinate to the more authoritative pronounce-
ments of the People themselves. Moreover, even with respect to the ordinary operations of 
government, the legislature is not omnipotent. On the contrary, the legislature is understood 
as merely one of three co-equal branches of government, each given sufficient power to check 
and balance the other two, with the precise purpose of making it implausible for the legisla-
ture to claim omnipotence on the ground that it alone speaks authoritatively for the People 
themselves. Once judicial review is viewed in light of these neo-Federalist principles, it does 
not seem such an anti-democratic anomaly-{)r so Ackerman argues. See Ackerman, We The 
People at 9-10, 261-64 (cited in note 3). 
7. See Ackerman, We The People at 252 (cited in note 3): "Anglophile critique has 
been important in diverting American constitutional thought from its Federalist roots." See 
also id. at 222: "Within the increasingly Anglophile world inhabited by leading constitution-
alists, the Federalist Papers were not so much forgotten as drained of their deeper meanings." 
8. In addition to the essay on We the People that appeared in this journal, see 
Sandalow (cited in note 6), Ackerman's book has been widely reviewed elsewhere as well. See 
William W. Fisher III, The Defects of Dualism, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 955 (1992); Michael J. 
Klarman, Constitutional Fact/Constitutional Fiction: A Critique of Bruce Ackerman's Theory 
of Constitutional Moments, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 759 (1992); Frederick Schauer, Deliberating 
About Deliberation, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1187 (1992); Suzanna Sherry, The Ghost of Liberalism 
Past, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 918 (1992). Moreover, Cass Sunstein credits Ackerman's work as 
being a substantial influence on the development of his own constitutional theory (although 
he does not subscribe to all of Ackerman's ideas). See Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitu-
tion 7, 23, 357 n. 3, 359 n. 15, 362 n. 29, 370 n. 21 (Harv. U. Press, 1993). Likewise, the 
philosopher John Rawls credits Ackerman's work as a major influence on his understanding 
of the role of judicial review in American democracy. See John Rawls, Political Liberalism 
§§ Vl:5 n. 19, VI:6 n. 12 (Columbia U. Press, 1993). Rawls, too, however, does not agree 
with all of Ackerman's ideas. See id. at § VI:6 n. 25. 
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an omnipotent Parliament.9 But Mount rejects the prevailing view, 
arguing that it is an inaccurate description of the British constitu-
tion's true nature, which he sees as being much closer than others 
realize to the American Constitution.w In any event, Mount is in-
terested not only in describing what the British constitution is, but 
also in prescribing what the British constitution ought to be, and he 
makes it very plain that he thinks the British constitution ought to 
be much more like the American Constitution than the prevailing 
view would allow. 
Mount points to three fundamental features of the American 
Constitution that should become revitalized in British constitu-
tional law: separation of powers, judicial review and federalism. 11 
In the ensuing pages I will summarize how Mount uses each of 
these principles to attack the idea of parliamentary omnipotence, 
and then offer some observations on how Mount's work might con-
tribute to the development of American constitutional theory. One 
might be tempted to say simply that Mount proves Ackerman cor-
rect, 12 but the lesson to be learned is more complex than that. 
II 
Quoting Federalist No. 47,13 Mount reminds his British read-
ers that separation of powers does not require that each branch of 
government be completely independent from the others, but only 
9. "The Constitution, we are told, is parliamentary supremacy and nothing but parlia-
mentary supremacy; it admits no considerations of natural Jaw or human rights, just as it 
admits no powers for subordinate or external Jaw-making bodies, except in so far as Parlia-
ment has defined and granted such powers." Mount adds: "And Parliament itself is a 
thinned-down version of what it once was, the threefold bundle of King, Lords and Corn-
mons having given way to a single all-powerful body impeded only faintly by the incrusta-
tions of tradition." 
10. Mount blames the prevailing misconception of the British constitution on three 
leading British scholars: Walter Bagehot, Albert Venn Dicey and Ivor Jennings. 
II. The term "federalism" refers to the vertical dimension of constitutional Jaw and 
should not be confused with the term "neo-Federalisrn," which Ackerman coined to describe 
his theory because of its reliance on Federalist Papers. Ackerman's theory of neo-Federalisrn 
concerns the horizontal dimension of constitutional Jaw at the national level of government; 
indeed, Ackerman's We the People barely mentions the vertical dimension of constitutional 
law and the significant issues it raises for any attempt to develop a complete and coherent 
theory of constitutional law. See note 47, infra. 
12. After all, if even a thoughtful British writer like Mount thinks that our Constitution 
is better than theirs, then surely we should not try to make our Constitution more like theirs, 
as the Anglophiles have tried to do. 
13. '[Montesquieu] did not mean that these departments ought to have no partial 
agency in, or no control over, the acts of each other. His meaning, as his own words 
import, and still more conclusively as illustrated by the example in his eye (i.e. 
England), can amount to no more than this, that where the whole power of one 
department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power in an-
other department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted.' 
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that each branch be sufficiently independent to check and balance 
the others. Such checks and balances, Mount argues, "are crucial 
to the British Constitution no less than to the Constitution of the 
United States." Without them, he points out, an unfettered Parlia-
ment "might act in a terrifyingly arbitrary and lawless fashion, ar-
resting people it disapproved of, silencing minorities, seizing 
property on trumped-up excuses." Thus, Mount reiterates the clas-
sic Madisonian argument that separation of powers is necessary to 
protect individuals and minorities from a tyranny of the majority. 
While this argument might seem stale to many Americans, 
Mount is challenging a society which assumes that parliamentary 
democracy rather than separation of powers is key to British free-
dom and good government, and he means to attack this assumption 
at its foundations. He sees the prevailing British faith in "parlia-
mentary monotheism" as "a kind of vulgar Rousseauism," pursuant 
to which "the general will must flow unimpeded through both the 
legislature and the executive, unchecked, unbalanced, unchal-
lenged." In short, Mount thinks that the contemporary under-
standing of British constitutional law is premised on a mistaken 
conception of democracy. Democracy should be understood, not as 
an effort to implement public opinion with the minimum of delay 
and impedance, but rather as a deliberative process (of the kind 
Madison envisioned) through which popular sentiments would be 
refined and distilled into sensible and coherent policy-policy 
which reflects "not only ... the will of the majority but also ... the 
aspirations, fears and interests of minorities."I4 And if one accepts 
that this sort of deliberative democracy is the goal of constitutional 
law, then one easily recognizes that a system of checks and balances 
is more appropriate than an omnipotent Parliament. 
What is more, Mount thinks that such checks and balances can 
be found within existing British institutions, if only these institu-
tions are resuscitated in accordance with longstanding British tradi-
tions.J5 Indeed, he points out that Madison, relying on 
Montesquieu, used Britain as his example of a government with a 
well-developed system of checks and balances. 16 Thus, in his effort 
to revive these traditional British institutions, Mount finds 
Madison, and other eighteenth century thinkers, to be more appro-
priate authorities than modem British constitutionalists, who have 
14. Cass Sunstein, in his new book, also emphasizes Madison's distinctive conception of 
deliberative democracy. See Sunstein, The Partial Constitution at 20-23 (cited in note 8). 
15. Mount states: "What I call ... 'the old spirit of our constitution' ... has in it a 
great deal more than the recognition of the law-making supremacy of Parliament." 
16. See note 13, supra. 
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allowed these institutions to atrophy.11 
The monarchy is one institution which Mount wishes to rein-
vigorate. He thinks the requirement that the monarch must sign all 
Acts of Parliament for them to become law should not be treated as 
a mere vestigial formality but instead should be understood as giv-
ing the monarch the power to veto legislation that is either proce-
durally or substantively unconstitutional. A law would be 
procedurally unconstitutional if Parliament had failed to comply 
with certain procedural rules governing special types of legislation 
(for example, a rule requiring a supermajority vote to repeal a Bill 
of Rights).1s An Act of Parliament would be substantively uncon-
stitutional if it "runs so contrary to justice that it is incompatible 
with [the monarch's] oath of office." For example, should the 
Queen "sign Acts legalising the deportation or murder of minori-
ties?"I9 Obviously not, in Mount's view, since the Queen has taken 
an oath, as ultimate "guardian of the Constitution," to preserve the 
basic liberty of her subjects.2o 
The House of Lords is another institution that, according to 
Mount, should have the power to reject unconstitutional legislation 
adopted by the House of Commons. But if the House of Lords is to 
perform this function, the percentage of hereditary peers must be 
reduced-so that the party composition of Lords is not too far out 
of line with that of Commons.21 Mount also suggests that some 
number of seats in the House of Lords be allocated to various indus-
try or labor groups. Although recognizing that this suggestion 
might be rejected for being a kind of "corporatism," he thinks it 
worth raising if only to provoke discussion of the various different 
ways in which the British people might be represented in Parlia-
17. Mount sees no incongruity in using the Federalist Papers as a guide to reconstruct-
ing British constitutional law, since he considers the Federalist Papers to be "an offshoot" of 
the same British tradition that boasts the likes of Burke and Blackstone. 
18. In such a circumstance, "the Queen would have an extremely good case for saying 
that to give assent to such legislation would be contrary to her Coronation Oath and that she 
would not assent until the correct procedures had been followed." 
19. Mount states: "The fact that such contingencies may never come the way of any 
particular monarch does not mean that his guardianship is an empty thing; the guardian's 
profession is, as Bagehot said of bankers, 'a watchful rather than a busy trade.· " 
20. In contemplating this veto power, Mount is unconcerned that the monarchy is a 
hereditary institution. To be sure, he acknowledges, the same power could be lodged in the 
office of an elected President so long as the President was elected directly and therefore in-
dependent of the legislature. But for Mount the crucial issue is the existence of the power and 
not the means by which the holder of this office comes to office. Thus, although Mount is not 
a monarchist in the strictest sense of the term, he is by no means a true republican either, 
notwithstanding his extensive reliance on the Federalist Papers. 
21. Under present arrangements, life peers are appointed by the monarch based on a list 
developed by the Prime Minister; therefore, the composition of the life peerage is not entirely 
immune from democratic politics. 
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ment other than the simple, straightforward way they are repre-
sented in Commons.22 
III 
One might think that if both the Queen and the House of 
Lords have the power to veto unconstitutional laws, there would be 
no need in Britain for Marbury-style judicial review. But on the 
contrary: just as the President and the Senate do not make Marbury 
superfluous in the United States, so too Mount considers judicial 
review necessary in Britain even if there are other institutional 
checks on the House of Commons. Indeed, Mount explicitly identi-
fies the following two "indispensable elements" of constitutional re-
form for Britain: (1) "an entrenchment clause covering certain basic 
essentials of the Constitution," including a Bill of Rights;23 and (2) 
"a supreme court which includes among its duties the interpretation 
and safeguarding of the entrenched provisions." Thus, Mount 
wants the practice of constitutional law in Britain to look essentially 
as it does in the United States. 
Mount truly appreciates the U.S. Constitution in a way that 
some Americans, regrettably, do not. Perhaps because he is a for-
eigner he, like de Toqueville and Bryce, has a perspective that 
Americans lack. In any event, he makes an assertion about the 
abortion controversy in American constitutional law that seems 
quite remarkable, especially considering the intellectual energy that 
has been devoted to the abortion issue among American constitu-
tional scholars: 
All constitutions, whether written or unwritten, are vulnerable to 
overworking; any statement of right or duty, however carefully 
phrased, can be pressed to the letter of its phrasing and beyond 
by legal and political activists. But a constitution which is prop-
erly articulated and generally understood will suffer, at worst, 
surface damage from the campaigners' probes; the majesty of the 
US Constitution-with all the space and civil certainty it confers 
22. Thus, this suggestion is in keeping with Mount's basic desire to develop a more 
complex and multi-faceted conception of representative democracy than the one that under-
lies the idea of unicameral omnipotence. Moreover, in this particular respect, Mount's views 
are very close to Ackerman's Neo-Federalist theory of representative democracy, which at-
tempts to fracture the representation of the electorate into multiple parts so that no single 
part is entitled to claim to speak for the People as a whole. See Ackerman, We the People at 
185 (cited in note 3). 
23. By "entrenchment," Mount means a provision that would prohibit the Bill of 
Rights from being amended by a simple majority of the legislature. One should not confuse 
Mount's use of the term "entrenchment" with Ackerman's. Ackerman defines an "en-
trench[ed]" Bill of Rights as one that is entirely unrepealable, even by a supermajority of 
voters. See Ackerman, We the People at 321 (cited in note 3). 
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upon its citizens-is not much impaired by, for example, enthusi-
astic over-interpretation by campaigners for and against abortion 
on demand. 
471 
This passage is a useful reminder to Americans (e.g., Ely and Bork) 
whose constitutional theories sometimes seem contrived as a re-
sponse to Roe v. Wade: do not discredit the essential nature of 
America's liberty-preserving structure just because the Supreme 
Court may have made an error or two.24 
Mount thinks he can fit a Bill of Rights and judicial review 
within the existing framework of British constitutional law, 
although he recognizes that, according to the prevailing view, 
neither an "entrenched" Bill of Rights nor judicial review is consis-
tent with the idea of parliamentary supremacy.2s In support of his 
position, Mount relies upon the elementary proposition that Parlia-
ment always must be bound by some antecedent set of procedures in 
order to be able to enact any measure into law. These rules of legis-
lative procedure typically define a quorum and what percentage of 
the quorum must vote in favor of a bill for it to be enacted. While 
the requisite percentage is usually a simple majority, Mount argues 
that it need not always be so. For special sorts of bills a 
supermajority might be required. 
Mount acknowledges that any supermajoritarian rule, to be le-
gally operative, would have to be adopted in an Act of Parliament 
pursuant to whatever procedural rules that then prevailed. There-
fore, if the prevailing procedural rules required only a simple major-
ity for all Acts of Parliament, then to enact a two-thirds 
supermajority requirement for certain special legislation would it-
self require only a simple majority. But just because a two-thirds 
supermajority rule can be adopted by a simple majority vote, it does 
not follow that the two-thirds supermajority rule, once enacted, 
may be repealed by a simple majority vote. Suppose a Bill of Rights 
enacted by Parliament explicitly provides: "Any amendment or re-
peal of any provision of this Bill requires assent by two-thirds of all 
members of Commons." According to Mount, the law of the land 
would then be that repeal of this Bill requires a two-thirds vote, 
even if the Bill originally was enacted by a simple majority.26 
24. The joint opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992), may 
reflect an attitude similar to Mount's in this respect. 
25. An entrenched Bill of Rights is thought incompatible with the idea that an omnipo-
tent Parliament cannot enact a law that reduces its own power. The consequence for judicial 
review is obvious: "Parliament, and Parliament alone, (has the power] to define and redefine 
the Constitution; the judges were to know their place." 
26. As Mount puts it, "the rules can only be changed according to the rules as they 
stand." Thus, in response to the parliamentary supremacists, Mount says: "In this proce-
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Because it would be unlawful for Parliament to repeal this en-
trenched Bill of Rights by a simple majority vote, Mount believes 
the judiciary would be justified in refusing to give effect to a mea-
sure, adopted only by a simple majority, that purported to repeal 
the Bill of Rights. In other words, the judiciary would be entitled 
to declare the purported repeal measure as being without force of 
law since it was not promulgated pursuant to established proce-
dures. In precisely this way, Mount believes that the institution of 
judicial review is already latent in British constitutional law. 
Furthermore, however, Mount thinks that the institution of ju-
dicial review, like the monarch's veto power, should not be limited 
to declaring legislation null and void if its enactment failed to com-
ply with procedural requirements, but rather should extend to in-
validating legislation that fails to comply with the substantive 
standards of basic justice. He applauds those few contemporary 
British judges who are willing to follow, however hesitantly, in the 
footsteps of Coke and the celebrated Doctor Bonham's Case: 
Above all, there has been Lord Denning ... who has kept alive in 
the minds of Englishmen an idea of law which is broader and 
higher and more enduring than the ever fattening annual 
volumes of Acts of Parliament. Now and then, this aspiration 
has led Denning into "making the law as it ought to be, instead 
of administering it as it is." That [is] an accusation [which] can-
not altogether be dodged. But ... the oath that judges take is to 
do justice according to law and, since they cannot help making 
law as well as administering it, justice requires that the law they 
make should be reasonable. 
Wishing, however, to secure a firmer footing for the kind of funda-
mental rights jurisprudence that we have in the United States, 
Mount thinks that Parliament ought to enact legislation that, in ad-
dition to entrenching a Bill of Rights, explicitly establishes a "con-
stitutional court" with the power to review Acts of Parliament for 
consistency with this Bill of Rights. 
IV 
As Mount wryly observes, the "religion of parliamentary mon-
otheism" does not tolerate the idea that Scotland or Wales might 
have its own legislature, sovereign in its own sphere, i.e., with a 
jurisdiction independent of the national Parliament at Westminster. 
Even more clearly incompatible with the doctrine of parliamentary 
dural sense, far from it being the case that 'no parliament can bind its successor,' every parlia-
ment cannot help binding its successor; the binding is what defines its successor as a true 
parliament and endows its decisions with proper authority." (emphasis in original). 
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omnipotence is the idea of a pan-European legislature with supreme 
powers in its areas of jurisdiction. But this rigid doctrine is no 
longer tenable, if it ever was, in view of changing economic and 
social conditions.27 
Moreover, Mount reminds us, the simplistic conception of de-
mocracy upon which the idea of parliamentary omnipotence is pre-
mised is flawed at its foundations. The doctrine assumes that 
constitutional law is to be designed solely for the British people, as 
if the British are the only relevant people in need of a legal structure 
for the purposes of self-government. Mount points out that there 
are the people of Scotland, and the people of Europe, as well as the 
people of Britain. Thus, Mount explains generally that there is no 
single people that one can regard as the ultimate source of all consti-
tutional authority but, instead, multiple groupings of peoples, de-
fined in different and sometimes overlapping ways, owing 
allegiances to different and sometimes overlapping constitutional 
structures. 
Constitutional law, Mount insists, must take account of these 
intricacies-even if the subject at hand is "British" constitutional 
law. "Having oversimplified, we need to recomplicate," he pro-
claims-this proclamation expressing the main point of his whole 
approach to constitutional law. And to help understand these redis-
covered complexities, he articulates two key concepts: "sub-
sidiarity" and "patriation." 
Subsidiarity. This term, which Mount acknowledges to be 
unartful, refers to the idea that the functions of government "should 
be exercised at the lowest practicable level of government." This 
means, first and foremost, that the European Community should 
not swallow up all the functions of the British government. At the 
same time, however, Mount identifies several functions of govern-
ment that can be performed practicably only at a pan-European, or 
perhaps even worldwide, level: environmental protection,2s free 
trade29 and monetary policy.3o 
27. Mount was anticipating the ratification of the Maastricht treaty, and significantly 
increased European integration, when he wrote his book. Although this process of centrali-
zation may have been set back somewhat by subsequent events, Mount's basic points about 
constitutional theory still hold true. 
28. Mount relies upon the work of public choice theorists to point out that polluters are 
Jess likely to thwart environmental regulation if the regulation occurs at the more centralized 
level of two governmental units. 
29. Once again, Mount looks to the U.S. Constitution as a model: "A really dedicated 
free-marketeer surely ought to welcome the installation of a supranational legal framework 
which would take the principles of free trade out of reach of the political lobbyists. He would 
look for a constitutional settlement which would include assertions of principle on the scale 
of those contained in the U.S. Constitution." 
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The principle of subsidiarity also requires that the British Par-
liament devolve to regional and local legislatures the task of resolv-
ing truly local problems. Mount condemns the Thatcher 
government for its wholesale destruction of local government in 
Britain, with all policy made at the national level. The conse-
quences include a loss of civic pride at the local or municipal level, 
thereby undermining the sense of collective responsibility in local 
communities. Mount believes that the remedy for this condition is 
to entrench the status of local institutions as a matter of constitu-
tional law, so that Parliament could no longer tinker with them by a 
simple majority vote.3I 
Patriation. This principle refers to the organization of govern-
ment along geographical lines that reflect existing ethnic or cultural 
divisions among peoples. Familiar to Americans, it is the idea be-
hind the rule that each state in the United States gets two votes in 
the Senate and, also, the rule that electoral districts for the House of 
Representatives do not cross state lines. But the principle was 
abandoned in Britain, with disastrous consequences according to 
Mount.32 
Mount recognizes that the principle of patriation requires devi-
ations from one-person-one-vote. But he defends these deviations 
with the following argument: 
An insistence on mathematical equality and symmetry may be 
less genuinely democratic, in that it betokens an indifference to 
the grievances of those regions or peoples who feel themselves 
unfairly dealt with by the application of unvarying rules. 
In other words, deviations from one-person-one-vote, like separa-
tion of powers and judicial review, can help to protect minority 
groups from a tyrannous majority. Such was the justification for 
giving Rhode Island the same number of votes in the Senate as New 
York, despite the disparities in their populations, and Mount be-
lieves that the same principle remains valid today. 
Mount would also tolerate other "asymmetries" in the struc-
ture of government.33 These asymmetries may be "untidy," but 
30. Mount favors a common European currency controlled by a European Central 
Bank. 
31. "The unbudgeable establishment of lower tiers of government in federal systems 
may be one of their principal virtues." 
32. Mount sees an urgent need to return to a system of local government organized 
along traditional county lines. "Such a rearrangement would correspond more naturally and 
exactly to the hierarchy of felt loyalties than these arbitrary and administratively feckless 
entities such as Tayside, Merseyside and Humberside-which are patently river gods with no 
worshippers." 
33. For example, just because Scotland or Northern Ireland is given a local parliament 
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Mount sees "untidiness" rather than "symmetry" as "a characteris-
tic of justice." He is, indeed, emphatic on this point: "[T]he matur-
ity of any political culture is to be measured very largely by the 
extent to which this is understood." This point, moreover, is yet 
another count in his general indictment of the parliamentary 
supremacists for having based their understanding of constitutional 
law on a much too simplistic conception of democracy. 
v 
From this review of Mount's book, it is obvious that Mount 
shares with Ackerman two basic beliefs: (1) an efficient unicameral 
legislature is an insufficient model of a well-designed democracy, 
even if the election of representatives to this assembly complies with 
one-person-one-vote and other requirements of political equality;34 
and (2) the Federalist Papers provide a rich source of ideas for artic-
ulating an alternative, more sophisticated conception of democracy 
upon which to base the development of constitutional theory. 
These two propositions are quite sound. To the extent that they 
have been inadequately appreciated by leading American constitu-
tional theorists, Mount's book serves as a useful reminder that 
Americans should heed Ackerman's call to reread the Federalist Pa-
pers, so that they can rediscover the distinctively complex concep-
tion of democracy that underlies the U.S. Constitution.Js 
But we must not take Mount as corroborating every aspect of 
Ackerman's constitutional theory. For example, there is nothing in 
Mount to support Ackerman's idea that the task of the Supreme 
Court is to interpret (if that is the right word) an unwritten amend-
ment to the Constitution that occurred during the New Dea}.36 My 
point is that there are different ways one might use the Federalist 
Papers in contemporary constitutional theory--different versions of 
"neo-Federalism," to use Ackerman's term. Ackerman may be cor-
rect in claiming that contemporary constitutional theory needs to be 
rooted in a "neo-Federalist" conception of democracy, but it does 
not necessarily follow that we should adopt Ackerman's particular 
brand of neo-Federalism.J7 
of its own, it does not follow that England also must have its own local legislature. The 
English, unlike the Scottish, may think that the British Parliament at Westminster adequately 
represents their interests, and there is no need to create a new layer of bureaucracy in Eng-
land if the English people themselves do not find it necessary. 
34. For an extensive and thoughtful discussion of the requirements of political equality, 
see Charles R. Beitz, Political Equality (Princeton U. Press, 1989). 
35. See Ackerman, We the People at 200 (cited in note 3). 
36. For criticism of this aspect of Ackerman's theory, see Sandalow, 9 Const. Comm. at 
330-37 (cited in note 6). 
37. Ackerman himself distinguishes between "dualist" and "Burkean" readings of the 
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Moreover, we must not be overly enthusiastic in embracing 
any form of neo-Federalism. No matter how many times we reread 
the Federalist Papers, they will not answer all our questions con-
cerning the optimal design of constitutional structures. Despite all 
the arguments of Mount and Ackerman, there are legitimate rea-
sons why many constitutional theorists-American as well as Brit-
ish-have been left unsatisfied by Madison's conception of 
democracy and are drawn, instead, to the idea of parliamentary 
supremacy. We ignore these reasons at our peril, just as it is also a 
mistake to ignore the wisdom of the Federalist Papers. 
Separation of powers is a good thing (for all the reasons Mount 
elaborates), but it is possible to have too much of a good thing. 
Checks and balances have their obvious costs as well as their obvi-
ous benefits: they make the operation of government more cumber-
some and inefficient, causing waste, delay and even gridlock or 
paralysis.Js The task of constitutional architects is to design a 
structure that will achieve an optimal balance between the conflict-
ing goals of maximizing efficiency and minimizing majoritarian tyr-
anny. It is not obvious that the system designed by Madison and 
his compatriots is satisfactory when judged by this standard.39 
More fundamentally, no matter how sophisticated a neo-Fed-
eralist conception of democracy may be, it cannot escape the fact 
that judicial review is countermajoritarian and therefore potentially 
undemocratic. 40 Ackerman wants to prove that judicial review is 
compatible with democracy because it is the enforcement of the 
People's will as expressed through the special lawmaking processes 
that exist for amending the Constitution. But, as Ackerman ac-
knowledges, the processes for amending the Constitution are 
supermajoritarian-as they must be, if judicial review is to fulfill its 
appointed mission of protecting individual and minority rights 
Federalist Papers, characterizing himself as a dualist. See, Ackerman, We the People at 17-22 
(cited in note 3). Mount, however, is heavily influenced by Burke, and therefore his work 
might be taken as supporting a Burkean, rather than dualist, version of neo-Federalism. See 
also Sunstein, The Partial Constitution at 130-31 (cited in note 8) (discussing Burkean consti-
tutional theory). 
38. See generally James L. Sundquist, Constitutional Reform and Effective Government 
(Brookings, rev. ed. 1992). 
39. In other words, our current system may have too many checks on the House of 
Representatives: the Senate, with its 60-vote rule for closing debate; the presidential veto; and 
judicial review. Notwithstanding Mount's arguments, perhaps the British should be wary 
before emulating all these elements of our constitutional law. 
40. I say potentially undemocratic, because judicial review is not necessarily undemo-
cratic-unless one adopts the unjustified assumption that only simple majority rule qualifies 
as democratic. Ackerman and Mount are surely right to reject this assumption. But it does 
not follow from rejecting this assumption that judicial review is necessarily democratic. On 
the contrary, it still poses the risk of being undemocratic. 
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against a potential tyranny of the majority. As we have seen, 
Mount's version of neo-Federalism is particularly clear in showing 
the link between judicial review and supermajoritarian voting 
procedures.4I 
While supermajoritarian procedures of the kind Ackerman and 
Mount envision may be sensible constitutional devices for protect-
ing individual and minority rights, the unavoidable fact remains 
that all supermajoritarian devices-including judicial review-inev-
itably pose a risk of tyranny of the minority. One need not be a 
disciple of Ely or Bork to hold this view. Indeed, the dangers of 
supermajoritarian voting-and judicial review-have been stated 
most persuasively by one of America's most respected political 
scientists, Robert Dahl.42 
Now a tyranny of the minority is obviously undemocratic, and 
because judicial review necessarily creates a risk that this kind of 
tyranny will occur, it is impossible to guarantee that judicial review 
is compatible with democracy. Perhaps for this reason, Mount does 
not make the effort that Ackerman does to square judicial review 
with democracy. Instead, Mount argues that judicial review is nec-
essary to secure justice. Perhaps one lesson to be learned from 
Mount is that constitutional law needs to be concerned more with 
justice and less with democracy. 
The problem with this lesson, of course, is that tyranny of the 
minority is unjust as well as undemocratic.43 Moreover, insofar as 
citizens of good faith disagree about the fundamental requirements 
of justice, how else are they to resolve their disagreement except by 
majority vote? Any other procedure runs the risk of minority tyr-
anny, and we are faced again with this form of injustice. It is pre-
cisely the inability to avoid this risk that has caused sensitive 
political scientists like Dahl ultimately to favor simple majority rule 
of a unicameral legislature over sophisticated systems with judicial 
review and supermajority voting.« 
41. If a Bill of Rights has been entrenched so that Parliament may not amend it without 
a supermajority vote, and if the judiciary has declared a subsequent Act of Parliament invalid 
because (in the court's judgment) it conflicts with the Bill of Rights, then a supermajority is 
necessary to legitimate the invalidated Act~ven if a simple majority of Parliament strongly 
believe that the judiciary has misinterpreted the Bill of Rights. 
42. Dahl explains that in a system with supermajoritarian voting, "the protection of 
majorities against abusive minorities can be no stronger than the [commitment of protected] 
minorities not to abuse their opportunities to veto majority decisions they dislike." See Rob-
ert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics !56 (Yale U. Press, 1989). For Dahl's eloquent and 
sensitive critique of judicial review, see id. at 188-92. 
43. Indeed, it is unjust because it is undemocratic. Democracy is an essential compo-
nent of justice. 
44. See also Akhil R. Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside 
Anicle V, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1043 (1988) (arguing that it would be legitimate to amend the 
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Yet even if one adopts a neo-Federalist perspective on constitu-
tional theory, one can-and should-retain a wariness about the 
dangers of judicial review. Cass Sunstein, for example, in his new 
contribution to constitutional theory, adopts a Madisonian perspec-
tive, yet his approach to judicial review is essentially a sophisticated 
form of Ely's representation-reinforcing theory.4s Sunstein is hesi-
tant to have the judiciary impose its substantive value choices when 
the citizenry has deliberated about an issue and a majority disagree 
with the judiciary.46 Sunstein's reluctance is one reason why his 
approach to judicial review is ultimately more persuasive than Ack-
erman's or Mount's. 
Finally, perhaps the most useful lesson American scholars can 
learn from Mount's work is the continuing importance of constitu-
tional law's vertical dimension: the structures that define the rela-
tionships between local, national and supra-national bodies. 
American constitutional theorists-at least contemporary ones-
have devoted little serious consideration to the vertical dimension. 
But the points that Mount makes about vertical issues are impor-
tant ones and should be appreciated by neo-Federalists, like Acker-
man and Sunstein, who recognize the complexities of constitutional 
law.47 
Consider, for example, the relevance of what Mount says about 
one-person-one-vote to the problem of Staten Island's place within 
New York City government. The U.S. Supreme Court has insisted 
that New York City comply with the requirement of one-person-
one-vote,4s and as a consequence Staten Island feels the need to se-
cede because it doubts that its distinctive regional interests can be 
represented adequately within a New York City government that 
U.S. Constitution by a simple majority vote of the American people in a national 
referendum). 
45. For a critique of Sunstein's new theory, see James E. Fleming, Constructing the 
Substantive Constitution, 72 Tex. L. Rev.- (1993). 
46. See Sunstein, The Partial Constitution at 123 (cited in note 8). Of course, to hesitate 
before one nullifies a law does not preclude nullification after careful consideration. It simply 
means that one fully recognizes the costs, as well as benefits, of judicial review. 
47. Sunstein has considered the vertical dimension in an article on secession, see Cass 
R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 663 (1991), but he does not 
address the issue in his new book on constitutional theory. Ackerman apparently thinks the 
issue of federalism is obsolete in American constitutional law. See Ackerman, We the People 
at 105 (cited in note 3). 
Ackerman believes that, as a consequence of the New Deal, "the federal government [is 
authorized to] operate as a truly national government, speaking for the People on all matters 
that sufficiently [engage] the interest of lawmakers in Washington, D.C." ld. 
A majority of the current Supreme Court disagrees with Ackerman on this point. See 
New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992) (5-4 decision) (prohibiting Congress from 
regulating radioactive waste management in ways that violate state sovereignty). 
48. See Board of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688 (1989). 
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complies with one-person-one-vote.49 The Supreme Court might 
have served justice and democracy better in this case had it heeded 
Mount's warning: "to understand that political arrangements . . . 
can never be perfectly ... symmetrical in every respect is the condi-
tion of a durable polity." 
More speculatively, the time has come for American constitu-
tional theorists to think about the relationship between the Consti-
tution of the United States and the Constitution of the United 
Nations. In keeping with the kind of questions that Mount asks 
about the British law's relationship to European law, we must ask 
ourselves whether American law adequately recognizes the 
supremacy of international law in those areas of jurisdiction where 
international law ought to be supreme. As we prepare for the next 
millennium, perhaps Mount's two principles of subsidiarity and pa-
triation can help us think through the appropriate relationship be-
tween U.S. law and U.N. law.so In this review, I can do no more 
than put these matters on the agenda of American constitutional 
scholarship. But I sincerely hope that America's leading constitu-
tional theorists begin to develop an adequate constitutional theory 
for the United Nations and not just the United States. 
VI 
Thus, Mount confirms Ackerman's view that constitutional 
theory is more complicated than simple-minded parliamentary 
supremacists would have us think. But many parliamentary 
supremacists are not so simple-minded, leading us to realize that 
constitutional theory is actually even more complicated than Acker-
man and Mount would wish us to believe. In the end, perhaps the 
best that can be said on the topic of judicial review is that all of us-
including neo-Federalists-must be ever mindful of the need to bal-
ance risks of majority rule against the risks of minority rule, realiz-
ing that a perfect balance can never be struck once and for all, but 
instead must be continuously recalibrated in light of new evidence 
49. See Richard Briffault, Voting Rights, Home Rule, and Metropolitan Governance: 
The Secession of Staten Island as a Case Study in the Dilemmas of Local Self-Determination, 
92 Colum. L. Rev. 775, 816 (1992). 
50. Following the principle of subsidiarity, we would not wish the U.N. to assume pre-
emptive responsibility over any issue that could be addressed adequately at the U.S. level. At 
the same time, however, must we not recognize that some issues (like global warming, ozone 
depletion and other environmental problems of worldwide concern) require international leg-
islation-and therefore a international legislature with the power to enact such legislation? 
And following the principle of patriation, we would want representation in this international 
legislature, as in the present U.N. General Assembly, to be based (at least in part) on a 
principle of one-nation-one-vote, for surely we are not yet ready to accept the principle of 
one-person-one-vote on a worldwide basis. 
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and insights about how the constitutional system actually works m 
practice. 
Moreover, when the vertical dimension of constitutional law is 
taken into account, the complexities facing constitutional theory be-
come much greater still. In short, notwithstanding the important 
contributions of Ackerman, Mount and others, much work still 
needs to be done. 
METAPHOR AND REASON IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS. 
By Haig Bosmajian.1 Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois Uni-
versity Press. 1992. Pp. xiv, 240. Cloth, $22.50. 
Eileen A. Scallen2 
One of my colleagues, a tax professor, heard that I was review-
ing Haig Bosmajian's book and bet that I would not find a meta-
phor in the regulations to the United States Tax Code. It took less 
than ten minutes of paging through the tax regulations to hit a 
couple-"safe harbor," "golden parachute"-then I stopped, lest I 
be accused of overkill.3 My colleague's challenge illustrates and ex-
tends one of Bosmajian's central points: "[a]t all judicial levels, 
I. Professor of Speech Communication, University of Washington, Seattle. 
2. Associate Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. 
Thanks to Joe Costella, Mary Kay Kane, Calvin Massey, Mary Wagner and Tom 
Weidenbach, who commented on earlier drafts of this review. 
3. My correspondence with the judge of our bet-the good professor's spouse, a distin-
guished student of literature-follows. The names have been changed to protect the inno-
cent. And me. 
To: Ms. Susan Spouse 
From: Professor Eileen A. Scallen 
Re: Metaphors in the Tax Code & Regs 
As you will recall, I bet your distinguished husband that I could find a metaphor in the 
regulations to the United States Tax Code. He was, to put it politely, skeptical. You kindly 
agreed to judge my efforts, which I set forth herein. 
A metaphor, as you know, is "[a] figure of speech in which two unlike objects are com-
pared by identification or by the substitution of one for the other." Karl Beckson and Arthur 
Ganz, Literary Terms: A Dictionary 156 (Noonday Press, 3rd ed. 1989). 
My assignment was not difficult. I will not tax you with the boring details, but I discov-
ered that metaphors are pervasive in both the tax regs and the tax code. Just a few examples 
should suffice. I.R.C. section 2800 sets forth the rule for "Golden Parachute Payments." 
Both the code and the regs refer to "safe harbors," see, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.62-2(g)(2). 
Of course, there are also the less transparent figures of speech. For example, property is 
described as being "in the hands of' someone (over 600 times in the regs alone, according to 
Lexis). If the drafters wanted to eschew metaphorical language, why didn't they say "in the 
possession of," or "in the control of' someone? 
Oh well, I'm glad they didn't. I believe I have won our bet. Hope to see you again soon 
Susan. 
